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ABSTRACT
This thesis analyzes the threat that unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs) pose to U.S. ground forces. The operational
environment in which both lethal and non-lethal UAVs may be
encountered by friendly surface forces is examined to
determine the elements of UAV operation which may be exploited
in defense against UAVs. Two probability models of the air
defense endgame are developed to examine the potential
lethality of hypervelocity rocket anti-UAV weapons. These
models are used to determine the detonation distance which
maximizes the probability that a single hypervelocity rocket
kills a UAV. Data used in this study are synthetic to prevent
disclosure of classified and proprietary information and allow
wider distribution of this thesis.
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THESIS DISCLAIMER
The reader is cautioned that computer programs developed
in this research may not have been exercised for all cases of
interest. While every effort has been made, within the time
available, to ensure that the programs are free of
computational and logic errors, they cannot be considered
validated. Any application of these programs without
additional verification is at the risk of the user.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES (UAVs) AS AN ASSET
The Joint Chiefs of Staff define an unmanned aerial
vehicle (UAV) as:
a powered, aerial vehicle that does not carry a human
operator, uses aerodynamic forces to provide vehicle lift,
can fly autonomously or be piloted remotely, can be
expendable or recoverable, and carry a lethal or non-
lethal payload. Also called UAV. Ballistic or semi-
ballistic vehicles, cruise missiles, and artillery
projectiles are not considered. (JCS, 1991, p. GL-4)
UAVs offer advantages in place of, or supplementing, manned
aircraft. The advantages include low cost, payload
modularity, high endurance, and reduced personnel
susceptibility.
Warfare has changed significantly since World War II.
Modern technology allows combat units to effectively fight at
long range day or night, even during adverse weather.
Improved mobility of surface forces, on land or sea, and
significant advances in aircraft capability have driven the
design, acquisition, and fielding of accurate long range
weapons. In many instances, the accuracy of modern weapons
has exceeded the precision targeting capability of surface
units. Sensors such as space-based reconnaissance satellites
are extremely expensive, over-tasked, and often do not provide
real-time imagery required for targeting data. UAVs have
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assumed a significant role in airborne reconnaissance. UAVs
are especially attractive because they minimize risk to
personnel and allow more capable manned aircraft to focus on
other missions. In light of impending defense cuts, UAVs
become even more attractive since they offer a low cost
alternative to manned aircraft or satellites. Reconnaissance
is the primary mission of most TJAVs. However, UAVs are also
designed to perform lethal missions such as suppression of
enemy air defenses and anti-radiation attack. The early
stages of the war with Iraq demonstrated that lethal UAVB
increase overall force effectiveness when used to supplement
manned strike missions. As U.S. forces are reduced in
response to the break-up of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact,
relatively low cost lethal UAVs, performing high risk
missions, become more important as military forces face
demanding missions with fewer personnel and less equipment.
UAVs are effective force multipliers which allow the military
to "do more with less."
B. flAys AS A THREAT
The obvious advantages of UAVs for U.S. forces also apply
to foreign militaries. The U.S. has never fought an enemy who
employed UAVs. However, it is likely that U.S. forces will
have to defend against UAVs in future conflicts. Analysis has
been done to understand the capabilities and effectiveness of
UAVs. However, much less work has been done to study the
2
susceptibility and vulnerability of U.S. forces to hostile
UAVs. The ability of U.S. forces to defeat enemy UAVs should
be addressed.
C. UAV SURVIVABILITY
Survivability analyses performed for the U.S. Army's
Aquila UAV program and the Joint Short Range UAV program
provide insight to anti-UAV capabilities and requirements.
The Center for Naval Analyses, Army Missile Command, and Naval
Air Development Center have performed survivability,
vulnerability, and susceptibility evaluations of various UAV
systems. These studies have used simulations to evaluate the
effectiveness of guns and missiles against U.S. UAVs. As
discussed in the Center for Naval Analyses' Joint UAV Phase I
Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis (U), it is
essential to study possible threats to the entire UAV system,
including the ground-based support elements. Both current and
future threats are considered to ensure the UAV system retains
survivability as developmental weapons become operational.
Survivability studies may also reveal the requirement for new
air defense weapon systems if current anti-UAV capabilities
are inadequate. The most prevalent threats to airborne UAVs
are guns, rockets, and electro-optical, infrared, and radar-
guided missiles. Although designed to study the
characteristics of UAVs, survivability studies discuss the
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limitations and capabilities of both ground- and air-launched
weapon systems which may be tasked to defend against UAVs.
Survivability studies include estimates and measurements
of UAV visual, infrared, radar, and aural signatures. These
data are essential for thorough evaluation of sensor
capabilities against UAV targets.
In addition to UAV survivability studies, the Joint
Tactics, Techniques and Procedures For Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles (UAV) manual also provides references to classified
documents which discuss threats to UAVs (JCS, 1991, p. 11-5).
The system threat assessment reports for the close range,
medium range, and endurance UAVs being developed by the Joint
UAV Program Office discuss the impact of generalized threats
and the characteristics of specific threats to these UAVs.
UAV survivability studies also provide insight into the
problem of defending against UAVs. Target susceptibility and
vulnerability assessments are essential to design of any air
defense weapon system. Studies which provide recommended
employment tactics also give the anti-UAV weapon designer an
understanding of where, how, and when an efficient operator
will employ his UAV assets. Using the models, simulations,
and information presented in UAV survivability and threat
assessment studies will accelerate the development of new




Consolidation of information regarding UAV capabilities
and the operational environment in which they are employed
provides an understanding of the requirement for an anti-UAV
capability for ground forces. The anti-UAV weapon system
envisioned by the U.S. Army Missile Command, Advanced Systems
Concepts Office incorporates an acquisition sensor module and
a killer module. A sensor system screening was performed in
1991. Information related to some candidate destruction
mechanisms is discussed in classified UAV survivability
studies. Hypervelocity rockets also present a viable anti-UAV
capability, not considered in previous UAV survivability
studies, that may offer a more lethal or cost effective kill
mechanism than systems currently in the U.S. air defense
weapon inventory.
E. OUTLINE
Chapter II provides an overview of UAV capabilities for
those readers who are unfamiliar with UAV technology and
operations. The recent history of UAVs is discussed with
emphasis on the effectiveness of UAVs in conflicts of the last
decade. UAV mission descriptions are described providing the
reader an understanding of the combat power of both lethal and
non-lethal UAVs. The various UAV system configurations and
payload options are described and representative systems are
provided. The land combat employment concepts for UAVs on the
non-linear battlefield are discussed since this thesis
focusses on the threat that UAV pose to U.S. ground forces.
Chapter III analyzes the combat environment in which UAVs
are likely to be encountered. The phases of UAV operation are
examined to understand how UAVs and their support equipment
may be defeated. Issues related to anti-UAV defense including
current sensor capabilities are discussed.
Chapter IV introduces the concept of using hypervelocity
rockets for air defense. A lethality model based on a cookie-
cutter damage function is developed from the engagement
geometry. The measure of effectiveness analyzed is the
probability that at least one hypervelocity rocket penetrator
impacts the UAV's vulnerable area. The fuzing of the rocket
is examined to determine how the rocket's effectiveness
against UAVs may be maximized. The model may be adapted to
consider the requirement for multiple hits. The model
assumptions are examined for appropriateness and a sensitivity
analysis with respect to the estimate of the UAV size is
performed.
Chapter V relaxes restrictive assumptions of the cookie-
cutter model and develops a more detailed model based on the
diffuse Gaussian damage function. This model allows for study
of targets which have vulnerable components separated by some
distance. The rocket fuzing is optimized to provide the
maximum probability of destroying the target. Again,
sensitivity to UAV vulnerable area estimate errors is examined
6
revealing that a biased estimate of UAV vulnerable area is
appropriate to provide a more robust rocket fuzing algorithm.
Chapter VI summarizes this thesis. Major conclusions are
addressed. Ways in which the models presented may be used are




Technological advances of recent decades have drastically
broadened UAV capabilities. Current technology allows
production of unmanned systems that are controllable by human
operators from long distances, or that operate autonomously.
Future unmanned systems will become even more capable at
performing battlefield reconnaissance and lethal attack
missions. Eighteen nations have already used UAVs in non-
target roles indicating that UAVs are likely to be part of
future combat of any intensity.
UAVs were used to defeat ground forces with great success
in two recent conflicts. Israeli forces used Mastiff, Scout,
and Samson UAVs as decoy and reconnaissance vehicles to
prepare for and perform an attack against Lebanon in 1982.
UAVs mimicked electronic signals typical of Israeli jets and
relayed the location of responding Syrian anti-aircraft radars
to an airborne E-2 Hawkeye. F-4 Wild Weasel anti-radiation
missile carrying aircraft, controlled by the E-2, destroyed
numerous Syrian surface-to-air missile sites in the Bekaa
Valley in just one day. The Israelis sustained minimal manned
aircraft losses while destroying more than 90 hostile aircraft
(Edwards, 1990, p. 8). It is significant to note that the
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U.S. lost three aircraft to anti-aircraft fire while attacking
Syrian positions without UAVs in 1983 (Shaker and Wise, 1988,
p. 100).
The U.S. Army, Marine Corps, and Navy flew 522 UAV sorties
totaling 1641 hours during combat operations against Iraq in
1990-91. At least one UAV was airborne at all times during
the operation and the Navy reported that "UAVs performed
superbly during Desert Shield/Storm" (Green, 1991, p. 8). The
Pioneer UAV was used to provide real-time battle damage
assessment, artillery and naval gunfire spotting/adjustment,
reconnaissance, advanced warning, and coordination of ground
and air operations. The French Alpilles Mini Avion de
Reconnaissance Telepilote (MART) UAV was also used for
reconnaissance and surveillance in support of coalition
forces.
Information collected by BQM-147A Exdrone UAVs allowed
Marine Corps ground units to move into Kuwait earlier than
expected. Ground launched BQM-47C Chukar target drones were
used in conjunction with Tactical Air Launched Decoys (TALD)
deployed from Navy and Marine aircraft to induce Iraqi units
to activate air defense radars. F-4 Wild Weasel aircraft
launched anti-radiation missiles to destroy the exposed radar
sites. These systems contributed significantly to successful
suppression of Iraqi air defenses during air strikes. These
air strikes effectively weakened Iraqi forces prior to ground
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engagement (Lovece, 1991, p.11). These examples demonstrate
the significant threat that UAVs pose to ground forces.
B. MISSION DESCRIPTION
1. Range and Endurance
UAVs of various range and endurance capabilities
threaten ground forces at all levels. Figure 1 shows the
Department of Defense approved UAV class categories (JCS,
1991, p. 1-3). Close range UAV systems will service lower
echelon tactical units, possibly of division size or smaller.
They give the enemy commander a view of the disposition of
both friendly and hostile forces within and beyond his weapons
range. Medium range UAV systems may be used to provide near
real-time reconnaissance data required for pre- and post-
strike planning for manned aircraft missions. They may also
be used as decoys or target designation vehicles to reduce the
susceptibility of manned aircraft while performing high risk
missions against U.S. forces. An enemy corps or theater-level
commander may utilize a high endurance UAV to provide wide
area surveillance of U.S. ground units and early warning of
U.S. advances. The information obtained from such a high
endurance UAV, fused with information obtained by shorter
range UAVs (controlled by enemy tactical units) and other
sensors, will provide the enemy commander an in-depth
perspective of combat progression, which may allow valuable









Figure I DOD Approved UAV Class Categories
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UAVs may provide opposing forces with theater
reconnaissance capability comparable to that of U.S. assets
(Dale, 1991, pp. 34-36). For example, they may be used for
temporary coverage comparable to that of reconnaissance
satellites. The Condor UAV is designed to fly at 65,000 feet
with an endurance of more than 120 hours and has the potential
to serve as a relatively inexpensive substitute for satellite
surveillance and early warning systems (Tice, 1991, p. 47).
2. Missions Utilizing Non-lethal UAVs
UAVs need not be capable of delivering weapons to be
of value. Enemy non-lethal UAVs may collect information about
the battlefield and U.S. forces, direct weapons to their
target, or assess damage. Some non-lethal missions are:
"* artillery or naval gunfire support
"* battle damage assessment
"* defense saturation
"* decoy
"* airborne surveillance for search and rescue
"* route and landing zone reconnaissance support
"* sonobuoy delivery
"* nuclear, biological, or chemical weapon usage detection
"* meteorological observation




The primary worth of non-lethal UAVs is their
capability to provide high-resolution imagery of the
battlefield. This information is extremely valuable because
it provides the targeting data and identification required for
effective long range attack. This feature will greatly
increase the lethality of the battlefield because enemy
commanders will be able to acquire information about U.S.
forces, fuse information from multiple sources, and distribute
information on a real-time or near real-time basis. These
factors will allow engagement of high value targets at long
distances with exceptional accuracy. The real-time
reconnaissance capability of UAVs provides battlefield
commanders accurate information in time to influence their
decisions and make combat operations more effective. Thus,
detection and attack of U.S. units becomes effective well
beyond direct fire range.
3. Usage of Lethal UAVs
Lethal UAVs are those configured to deliver ordnance
or be guided as "kamikaze" weapons. The distinction between
modern missiles and lethal UAVs is blurred at best. However,
a useful distinction is that missiles are typically designed
for one-time use. Lethal UAVs may possibly be recovered and
reused if they do not find a suitable target.
An example of a lethal UAV is the Tacit Rainbow
emitter attack weapon, which was under development for the
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U.S. Air Force. This system can fly autonomously; loiter in
a predetermined area; and then detect, classify, and attack
active emitters (Libbey and Putignano, 1990, p. 42). The
German Dornier DAR UAV also performs anti-radar missions
autonomously in a pre-programmed search area. Lethal UAVs
provide a cost effective means of decreasing the
susceptibility of costly close support aircraft (Karch, 1990,
p. 47). Some lethal UAV missiuns are:
"* anti-radiation attack
"* suppression of enemy air defenses
"* vehicle attack




UAVs may be classified by configuration: lighter-than-
air, rotary, fixed-wing propeller, or jet. Each configuration
has advantages and disadvantages as shown in Table I.
a. Lighter- Than -Air
Lighter-than-air UAVs are especially well-suited
for long endurance surveillance and early warning missions.
High altitude capability allows onboard sensors to provide
over-the-horizon detection. Look-down viewing aspect from
enemy UAVs may also allow detection of low-flying U.S.
14
TABLE I UAV CONFIGURATION ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES
Configuration Advantages Disadvantages
Lighter-Than-Air long endurance slow speed
high altitude poor maneuverability
capability high vulnerability
low maintenance
Rotary vertical take-off maintenance intensive
and landing slow speed
maneuverability not aircraft launchable
ability to hover





Fixed-Wing Prop long endurance difficult shipboard
higher speeds recovery
flexible payloads launch/recovery system
required
Fixed-Wing Jet high speed higher cost
long range high tech maintenance
high IR signature
high aural signature
aircraft normally obscured by surface clutter. The U.S. Air
Force Seek-Sky-Hook aerostat program provides radar coverage
in the Florida Straits to guard against air incursions from
Cuba (Shaker and Wise, 1988, p. 116). The U.S. Customs
Service and Coast Guard use tethered aerostats for drug
interdiction and law enforcement operations. As U.S. drug
interdiction operations become more effective, smugglers may
utilize UAVs to detect and avoid U.S. law enforcement forces.
b. Rotary
Rotary UAVs provide significant launch and
recovery advantages. No external equipment is needed and
minimum area is required for vertical takeoff and landing.
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All-weather launch and recovery capability is possible using
systems similar to the Canadian BEARTRAP or U.S. RAST used to
position, launch, and recover manned helicopters onboard ships
in high sea states. The Canadian CL-227 Sentinel UAV utilizes
such a system (Shaker and Wise, 1988, p. 107). Rotary systems
typically require more maintenance time due to the dynamic
components inherent in rotor systems, but are less likely to
be damaged during recovery. The standard shipboard recovery
method for fixed-wing UAVs is to fly them into a net which
usually causes structural damage (Davis, 1991, p. 23). Rotary
UAVs are difficult to launch from aircraft. However, rotary
systems are especially well-suited for shipboard operations.
c. Non-Rotary VTOL
Non-rotary VTOL (vertical takeoff and landing)
UAVs offer the maneuverability and takeoff/landing advantages
of rotary UAVs yet allow greater speed. Some advanced designs
allow high subsonic speed capability. Shrouded fan designs
have been explored by Sandia National Laboratories for the
U.S. Marine Corps (Shaker and Wise, 1988, pp. 113-114). This
system, Airborne Remotely Operated Device (AROD), may
incorporate a fiber optic cable link to transmit video camera
images from the UAV to an operator's heads-up display. The
system may also carry hypervelocity rockets to be fired
downward at armored vehicles thereby increasing the
probability of damage, since these targets are more vulnerable
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topside. This type of UAV remains relatively undeveloped and
it is unlikely that U.S. forces will encounter them as
opposition.
d. Fixed-Wing Propeller
The majority of operational UAVs are fixed-wing
propeller-driven aircraft. These have a relatively simple
design, long range, high reliability, high endurance, payload
modularity, multiple launch options, and low cost. The engine
size required to power these aircraft allows them to remain
very light. This, combined with composite material advances,
makes these systems capable of carrying a wide array of
sensors or weapons. Such systems can be launched by hand,
railed launchers, jet assist, or aircraft drop. This is the
most common UAV type and is likely to remain so because of low
cost and wide availability. U.S. forces will probably
encounter enemy UAVs of this type.
e. Fixed-Wing Jet
Fixed-wing jet-powered UAVs offer significant
speed and power advantages. Additional power from jet
propulsion allows the UAV to carry more fuel, sensors, or
weapons than propeller-driven UAVs. A jet UAV is typically
less expensive to build than a manned jet aircraft; the
absence of crew support systems alone represents substantial
savings. Such UAVs were used extensively by the U.S. during
the Vietnam war (Miller, 1988, pp. 15-19). The relatively
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high cost of jet engines makes these UAVs significantly more
expensive than other types. Jet engines also provide a larger
infrared signature than lower performance engines, and the
stronger airframes required to support the additional weight
of jet engines may provide a larger radar cross section,
increasing detectability. Stealth technology offers greater
survivability but may also overwhelmingly increase the UAV
cost. It is also unlikely that forces opposing the U.S. will
have stealth technology available for the design of aircraft
in the near-term. If the speed of a jet is required, a UAV
may be used to avoid the risk of human life anid scarce manned




UAV sensors include video or still cameras, low-
light television, forward-looking infrared (FLIR), laser range
finders, infrared line scanners, signals intelligence or
electronic counter measure devices, radar, and meteorological
or nuclear-biological-chemical agent measuring devices. A
single UAV may carry multiple sensors, or interchangeable
sensor modules. Meteorological conditions such as cloud
cover, humidity, and temperature significantly impact sensor
effectiveness. Numerous sensors are available for various
missions and weather conditions.
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b. Lethal Weapons
Enemy UAV weapons may be tailored for specific
missions. The simplest design may consist of a model airplane
loaded with plastic explosives flown by remote control to
attack soft targets; such might be well-suited for surgical
strikes by special operations or terrorist units. The other
end of the design spectrum may be represented by "mini-bomber"
UAVs delivering smart munitions as do modern strike aircraft
(Dugdale, 1987, p. 127). Developmental Sciences' Skyeye UAV
design incorporates four wing load stations which can carry
2.75 inch ground attack rockets, deployable jamming modules,
and perhaps even Stinger missiles (Aviation Week and Space
Technology, 1986, pp. 68-83). It is likely that U.S. forces
will not encounter such highly sophisticated systems. Lethal
UAVs like the U.S. Tacit Rainbow or Israeli Harpy are capable
of long loiter and autonomous firing for continuous
suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD). Without these UAVs,
SEAD operations cannot be performed continuously. SEAD is
often performed only prior to major air strikes, alerting the
enemy to an impending attack (Kelleher, 1988, p. 46).
3. Communications and Control
Reliable communication with a remote operator is
essential to mission success for many UAVs. UAV command
uplink, status downlink, and data link utilize radio
transmissions in the 20-1800 Mhz range. These communications
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may be encrypted for security. Short range systems may also
use fiber optic cable links (Culver and Smith, 1991, pp. 24-




UAVs are substantially smaller than manned aircraft,
making them relatively difficult to detect with optical
sensors. Visual detectability of an aircraft is dependent
upon an optical difference between the aircraft and its
background. In comparison with manned aircraft properties,
UAV luminance contrast with the background is minimal due to
the absence of lighting, reduced exhaust glow from small
engines, and less surface reflection. Reduced luminance
contrast increases the importance of chromatic contrast.
Tactical paint schemes may be used to camouflage a silhouette
enhanced by chromatic contrast. It has been determined that
blue/gray colored UAVs are less susceptible to electro-optical
missiles than are green colored UAVs.
2. Infrared
The light weight of a typical UAV allows the use of
small engines, which produce a relatively weak infrared (IR)
signature. The IR signature may be reduced by ducting exhaust
through the propeller or rotor wash to quickly dissipate hot
gases. Similar systems have been used on U.S. helicopters.
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IR jammers have also been deployed on U.S. helicopters;
miniaturization of such jammers may be possible, allowing
their use on UAVs.
3. Radar
Metal skins of conventional manned aircraft produce a
relatively large radar cross section. Stealth designs are
available to reduce radar cross section, but are costly. Many
UAVs are constructed with composite materials which do not
reflect radar. Radar penetrates much of the UAV surface but
may partially reflect off internal equipment. Radar cross
section may be reduced by use of radar absorbing materials.
Developmental Sciences' Skyeye UAV incorporates eight pounds
of radar absorbing material, yielding a side aspect radar
cross section of less than 0.15 m2 (Aviation Week and Space
Technology, 1986, pp. 68-83). Radar cross sections of future
UAVs may be as small as 0.001 m2 with the use of composite
materials and radar absorbing materials. On the other hand,
simple devices which increase radar cross section allow UAVs
to successfully function as decoys imitating larger aircraft.
4. Acoustic
The engines for many non-jet UAVs are small enough to
allow the use of a sound muffler, thereby reducing acoustic
detectability. Limited research has been done to investigate
the feasibility of detecting or tracking aircraft with
acoustic devicea,. Battlefield noise may make reliable and
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predictable aural detection of UAVs very difficult. However,
since UAVs do not have the characteristically large infrared
and radar signatures of manned aircraft, use of acoustic
systems warrants consideration. Acoustic sensors may allow
U.S. ground forces to passively search for UAVs, reducing the
probability of counter-detection. Modification of existing
acoustic detection systems or development of new systems may
provide a reliable method of detecting UAVs.
E. REPRESENTATIVE SYSTEMS
Tables II and III profile representatives of major UAV
configurations. These characteristics provide typical
performance parameters for different configurations.
F. L?,ND COMBAT EMPLOYMENT CONCEPTS
Battlefield commanders now influence a much larger area
than they did in the past because of increased weapons' range,
accuracy, and mobility. Modern warfare is not tied to head-on
confrontation. Advanced systems provide enemy forces the
capability to attack U.S. forces' weak points at opportune
times and locations (Forster, 1991, p. 15). UAVs can serve as
sensors to fill gaps between widely dispersed, highly mobile
units.
UAVs may enable opposing units to efficiently search for
and locate U.S. forces. UAVs provide time critical
information required to successfully attack far beyond the
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TABLE II REPRESENTATIVE FIXED-WING UAV SYSTEMS
Fixed-Wing Propeller
Name: Pioneer 1 (USN, USMC)
Manufacturer: AAI (US), Mazlat (Israel)





Wing Span: 16.9 ft
Endurance: 6-9 hrs
Ceiling: 15000 ft
Cruise speed: 48-70 mph (Max 106 mph)
Maximum Range: 100 miles
Sensors: video, FLIR, ESM, laser range finder
Notes: 1) high winged fiberglass and metal monoplane
2) rear mounted engine
3) remote control operation
4) launched takeoff or runway running takeoff
5) net recovery or runway landing











Top speed: 668 mph
Maximum Range: 1,105 miles
Sensors: ESM, Weather sensors, video
Special missions: ordnance delivery and jamming
Notes: 1) cantilever high-wing monoplane
2) air, land or ship launch
3) parachute recovery
4) pre-prograummed or remotely controlled
forward line of one's own troops. It is likely that these
systems will be relatively simple, require minimal training,
and not detract from other tasks. For lower-level tactical
operations, UAVs may be deployed in large numbers.
Enemy UAVs may disrupt U.S. operations by locating and/or
attacking command posts, air defenses, communications
equipment, and logistics centers. Lethal UAVs may effectively
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TABLE III REPRESENTATIVE NON-FIXED-WING UAV SYSTEMS
Lightsr-Than-Air
Name: Model 500 Aero-ship
MZLltacturer: FUJI (Japan)
Powarplant: two 1.3 hp air cooled engines
Weight: 41 lb
Length: 26 ft
Wing Span: 10.7 ft
Ceiling: 3,280 ft
Max speed: 50 mph
Sensors: video and others
Rotary
Name: CL-227 Sentinel (Canadian Navy)
Manufacturer: Candair (Canada)




Body Width: 2.1 ft
Rotor Arc: 8.3 ft
Endurance: 4 hrs
Ceiling: 9,200 ft
Top speed: 80+ mph
Maximum Range: 30+ miles
Sensors: video, audio, IR, radar
Notes: 1) contrarotating 3 blade propellers
2) remote control operation
3) automated shipboard recovery system
Non-Rotary VTOL
Name: SHORTS SKYSPY
Manufacturer: Short Brothers PLC (UK)




Body Width: 3.6 ft
Fan Diameter: 2.8 ft
Endurance: 1.5 hrs
Ceiling: 6,000 ft
Top speed: 118 mph
Sensors: video and others
Notes: 1) remotely controlled ducted fan VTOL
2) secure data link
locate U.S. forces and attack autonomously, allowing enemy
personnel to concentrate on other tasks. UAVs provide
reconnaissance and battle damage assessment information
required to deliver effective long range weapons and conduct
re-attacks. Intelligence data collected by UAVs provides the
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battlefield commander timely knowledge of the threat and an
appreciation of the relative combat power of the opposing
force (Coghlan, 1989, p. 59). This capability should provide





UAVs have varying potential to inflict damage on ground
forces that is dependent on configuration, control mechanism,
mission, and environment. An effective anti-UAV system must
be able to counter threats at various levels of the UAV
capability spectrum. Examination of UAV operations yields a
thorough representation of the threat presented by UAVs. Such
an analysis assesses the information and performance
capabilities required for successful anti-UAV operations.
All UAV missions, both lethal and non-lethal, are
characterized by some combination of the following phases of
operation: launch and recovery, transit, search and
surveillance, data transfer, and attack. Examination of UAV
performance capabilities during each phase reveals system
elements which have vulnerabilities exploitable by ground
forces defending against UAVs.
1. Launch and Recovery
UAV missions begin with the launch phase. Detection
during this phase is very difficult. Launch of long range
UAVs typically occurs far behind the forward line of troops,
while launch of close and short range UAVs may occur from
almost any point on the battlefield. Ground support
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facilities for remotely-piloted UAVs are often collocated with
the launch site. Successful attack of UAV control facilities
will significantly degrade UAVs under remote-control
operation. Ground-based elements of UAV operations are not
hardened and are vulnerable to attack by artillery, surface-
to-surface missiles, and ground-attack aircraft. Detection of
UAV launch and recovery operations or storage facilities may
allow destruction of UAV support equipment and information
processing stations. If UAV operations are perceived to be
having a major impact on a battle, ground-based elements of
UAV operations may become primary targets for ground-attack
aircraft. Location and destruction of UAV storage and basing
facilities will significantly degrade enemy reconnaissance and
attack capabilities. However, autonomous UAVs do not require
a control facility; their launch site is usually very mobile.
In fact, many U.S. lethal UAVs are launched from fighter or
attack aircraft.
2. Transit
Once remotely controlled UAVs are airborne, command
uplink and status or data downlink may be detectable or
jammable. However, this is not a completely reliable means of
detecting or defeating UAVs. UAV guidance may be provided by
pre-programmed flight path or tethered link not requiring
detectable radio frequency transmissions. For example, a
fiber optic cable control link is employed in the AROD UAV.
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Remote-controlled UAVs may also be pre-programmed to fly a
specific mission profile in the event of control link jamming
or malfunction. The Skyeye UAV circles while increasing
altitude for a predetermined time, then flies the last known
recovery course in the event of lost data link (Aviation Week
and Space Technology, 1986, pp. 68-83). UAVs may be
controlled by mixed remote and pre-programmed guidance as is
done in the Belgian Epervier system. As shown in Figure 2,
the Epervier is visually guided at take-off, remotely
controlled by radio during transit to and from the
surveillance area, and guided by a pre-programmed course
during surveillance (Jane's Battlefield Surveillance Systems
1990-91, 1990, p. 176). Thus, control link transmissions may
be detectable or susceptible to jamming during some part of a
hostile UAV flight or not at all.
UAVs present smaller signatures and vulnerable areas
than manned aircraft under the same scenario. However,
scenario conditions may be very different. UAVB need to skirt
terrain profiles more widely than do manned aircraft because
the absence of a human aircrew reduces terrain avoidance
capability (Dean, 1990). UAVs typically do not possess any
evasive maneuvering capability and often fly at relatively
slow airspeeds. Also, UAVs may need to fly closer to targets
than do manned aircraft to be effective. These factors may
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3. Search and Surveillance
UAV sensor capabilities influence the threat to ground
forces. The maximum distance at which a UAV can endanger
ground forces is considered the keep-out range. Obviously,
the keep-out range or susceptibility of ground forces
increases as UAV sensor effective range increases. However,
increasing UAV sensor range involves weight and cost
compromises which must be considered in the analysis of the
UAV threat.
a. Optical Sensors
Optical sensor systems are the type most commonly
employed on UAVS. This technology is well developed and light
weight, high-resolution video equipment is readily available
and relatively inexpensive. The major drawbacks to optical
sensors are their environmentally limited range and narrow
instantaneous field-of-view. These features tend to limit
surveillance capability and increase search times. The
primary advantage of optical systems is the capability for
positive visual identification of targets, which is necessary
to avoid friendly-fire casualties. Low-light television
technology allows night operation. UAV optical sensors are
capable of making detection of typical battlefield targets at
a range of approximately 1.5 kilometers. (Dynetics, 1991, pp.
6-1 - 6-20)
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b. Forward-looking Infrared Sensors
Forward-looking infrared (FLIR) technology has
greatly increased night fighting effectiveness. FLIRs allow
detection with relatively wide fields-of-view, thereby
increasing UAV search area and decreasing search time compared
to those of an optical sensor. Battlefield targets often have
an infrared signature more detectable than their visual
signature since cczouflage techniques can effectively defeat
optical sensors. As is true of optical sensors, FLIR system
effectiveness is highly dependent on environmental factors
such as haze, humidity, and temperature. UAV wide field-of-
view FLIR sensors are capable of detecting battlefield targets
at a range of approximately 3 kilometers. (Dynetics, 1991, p.
4-17)
c. Radio Frequency Intercept Sensors
Radio frequency intercept (RFI) systems provide a
passive sensor capability which does not require the UAV to
actually "see" the target. Electronic emissions are
detectable by relatively unsophisticated devices which provide
accurate bearing information. They allow detection of active
sensors at a much greater range than the active system's
effective range. RFI systems offer all-weather, day/night
capability since they are less dependent on the environment
than are other passive sensors. RFI provides bearing-only
information, and significant search times may be required to
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localize an intermittent mobile target. However, RFI provides
a means of cuing visual sensors (Roy, 1991). This sensor type
is well-suited for a high endurance, autonomous, lethal anti-
radiation UAV. A computer library of emitter characteristics
may allow classification of targets to facilitate prioritized
target selection. A major limitation of RFI sensors is that
they provide no capability to detect electronically passive
targets.
d. Laser Range Finders
All passive sensors share the inability to provide
precise instantaneous target location information. When
terrain is relatively uniform, information from ground or
satellite positioning systems may be used to estimate the
target location coordinates. This position information may
provide sufficient precision for surveillance purposes or some
targeting missions. However, the use of a laser range finder
onboard the UAV provides actual slant range to targets and
provides precise target location data, even under varying
terrain conditions.
e. Radar
An obvious way to increase UAV sensor range is to
use an active detection system such as radar. Active sensors
also provide precise range information for instantaneous
target location, which passive sensors do not. Moving target
indicator (MTI) radar for UAVs allows detection of targets
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moving faster than 4 meters per second within a 15 kilometer
radius of the UAV. This system increases the rate of coverage
over typical optical sensors by approximately a factor of 170
(Shyman, 1988, pp. 1-2). A radar system usually adds more
weight to the UAV than do passive sensors, but MTI systems
that weigh as little as 125 pounds are currently available.
However, this represents relatively advanced technology which
may not be available to all nations. Also, MTI radar
equipment is probably too expensive to justify use on
inexpensive UAV platforms that will suffer high attrition.
The major drawback of active sensors is that they are easily
detectable by opposing forces. Also, radar does not provide
positive target identification, which is typically required by
U.S. rules of engagement; opposing forces may not have such
demanding target identification requirements.
4. Data Transfer
There are two primary types of non-lethal UAVs: those
with real-time data link capability, and those without; both
present a threat to ground forces. However, these threats are
different. A UAV with real-time imagery capability endangers
ground forces as soon as it closes to the effective range of
its sensors and allows long range targeting of these forces.
As the duration of UAV real-time imagery of a ground force
increases, the effectiveness of an attack based on that
information increases. Continuous surveillance of a target
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allows for correction of fire and battle damage assessment,
which greatly increase the probability that the target is
destroyed.
A UAV designed to collect and record surveillance
information during its flight with no data link capability
cannot provide immediate targeting information on ground
forces. These UAVs provide information only after recovery.
However, the ground forces detected by a UAV are susceptible
to follow-on attack if they are not mobile enough to clear the
area of detection, or to counter-attack before the UAV
information is processed. It is clearly desirable that U.S.
ground forces be able to determine if they have been observed
by a surveillance UAV. Changes in positions of ground units
detected by UAV sensors may reveal U.S. strategy and allow
anticipation of future actions; this is an important mission
of endurance UAVs. Thus, the UAV information transfer
configuration determines the susceptibility time window for
ground forces detected by UAV sensors.
5. Attack
UAVs endanger ground troops in two ways: direct and
indirect attack. A non-lethal UAV may provide real-time
target location data or target designation for artillery,
naval gunfire, and missile attack; or it may jam ground
sensors and communications. A lethal UAV will fly directly at
detected ground units for attack. The primary difference
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between these two dangers is that the UAV targeting for other
weapon systems, can effectively guide weapons to, or jam, the
ground unit from its maximum effective sensor or jammer range,
while a lethal UAV must close to within the lethal radius of
its weapon for successful attack. Lethal weapon radius is
typically much shorter than sensor range. Although the lethal
UAV may present a more tangible danger to ground troops, it
must fly much closer to U.S. forces than a non-lethal UAV to
inflict damage. A jamming UAV may be able to effectively jam
from a distance of 6 kilometers; a reconnaissance UAV may
provide accurate targeting information from 1.5 kilometers; a
lethal UAV may have to achieve a direct hit to be effective
(Smith, 1987, p.185). These differences allow various
reaction times for ground forces.
Laser range finders allow a UAV to provide extremely
precise targeting data for weapons. A laser target designator
aboard the UAV potentially provides precision munitions
guidance. This preciEion is required to minimize collateral
damage to non-military elements near military targets and was
successfully demonstrated by coalition forces in the Gulf War.
Virtual attrition is the reduction of a combat force's
effectiveness due to the perception of significant threat from
opposing forces if certain actions are taken. The force's
effectiveness is lower than expected due to the anticipated
hostile force action. For example, if air defenses are
successfully shooting down low level bombers, the bombers may
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elect to perform high altitude bombing runs which are not as
accurate and do not cause as much damage even though no more
aircraft are being shot down at low level. (Ball, 1992, p. 9)
Lethal UAVs contribute to overall combat effectiveness
through direct attack of ground forces and virtual attrition
of ground forces. Hostile ground forces may become less
willing to radiate active sensors when they risk destruction
by lethal anti-radiation UAVs. Virtual attrition effects will
increase as enemy ground forces are successfully attacked by
UAVs. This effect will increase the survivability of ground
forces using UAVs (Karch, 1990, p. 50).
B. ANTI-UAV DEFENSE
1. Intelligence
An effective anti-UAV weepon system should be
successful against many types of UAVs. However, accurate
intelligence information will narrow the spectrum of UAV
characteristics to be defended against in a specific region or
conflict. For this reason, sensor and weapon modularity
significantly improve the potential effectiveness of an anti-
UAV weapon system. The anti-UAV system may be tailored to the
anticipated threat to maximize effectiveness. Modularity also
provides the capability of integrating multiple acquisition
and attack modules to maximize sensor and weapon coverage.
For example, if it is known that an opposing force possesses
pre-programmed autonomous UAVs, an anti-UAV system relying
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solely on detection of control link emissions will be
inadequate.
Ideally, UAV launch and support facilities will be
targeted and destroyed before UAVs are used against U.S.
forces (Murphy, 1987, p. 69). However, short range UAVs may
be dispersed throughout the battlefield, making complete
destruction difficult. UAV ground support facilities are
smaller and more difficult to locate than are manned aircraft
facilities. However, UAV facilities may be less well defended
and located closer to the enemy and therefore, are more likely
to be attacked than conventional airports. The ground support
element is likely the least redundant component of most UAV
systems and therefore a priority target.
2. Point Versus Area Defense
A major issue in air defense is the transition between
area and point defense. This distinction is determined by the
mission and mobility of the unit defending against UAVs. Area
defense is appropriate for high value regional assets such as
Patriot missile sites, logistics depots, or command and
control centers. Point defense is appropriate for local
assets such as dispersed, highly mobile units.
Area defense against UAVs is made especially difficult
by the inherent low-observable characteristics of UAVs. Long
range detection of UAVs is accomplished only by high power
radars. These systems are expensive, relatively immobile, and
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quite possibly will require protection against UAV attack
themselves while engaged in the air battle.
The difficulty of long range detection of UAVs implies
that an effective anti-UAV weapon must be capable of moving
with the ground maneuver forces it is to protect. In the case
of defending armored units, the anti-UAV system must be able
to move with the leading elements through difficult terrain or
water, with sufficient armor to survive close combat (Ball,
1985, pp. 110-111).
3. Search and Surveillance Capabilities
Active search for UAVs seems desirable because radar
systems have relatively large search volumes and long
detection ranges. However, active radar systems are
detectable by enemy forces, and are susceptible to anti-
radiation attack. Long range radar search for UAVs is only
appropriate for units that do not require covertness or high
mobility.
a. Radar
Reliable detection of UAVs with radar cross
sections as small as 0.001 m2 is possible at ranges of 65
kilometers or greater using systems such as the AN/TPS-32 or
AN/TPS-70 long range tactical air defense radars. These
systems are transportable by truck, aircraft, or helicopter,
but require substantial time and effort to reposition and are
considered relatively fixed-position, long range assets.
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(Jane's Radar and Electronic Warfare Systems 1991-92, 1991,
pp. 74-75)
Air defense surveillance radars like the TPQ-36A
system can detect some UAVs at ranges of 14 kilometers or
greater. These radars are highly mobile and are transportable
by light vehicles or aircraft. The TPQ-36A provides high
three dimensional accuracy in severe clutter and electronic
counter measure (ECM) environments. Use of a low sidelobe,
electronically phase-scan, pencil beam antenna minimizes
clutter effects for low level detection, hostile ECM
effectiveness, and susceptibility to anti-radiation attack.
(Jane's Radar and Electronic Warfare Systems 1991-92, 1991,
p. 73)
Battlefield surveillance radars like the Portable
Search and Target Acquisition Radar (PSTAR) system allow
detection of UAVs at ranges of 4 kilometers or greater. These
portable systems are designed for use by light infantry units.
These systems have the ability to reduce ECM effectiveness and
to provide excellent detection in high clutter. The PSTAR
system is designed for deployment from the High Mobility
Multi-Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV), and can move in and out of
positions in less than 10 minutes. The PSTAR system also is
capable of near real-time interface with command and control
networks or weapons platforms. (Jane's Battlefield
Surveillance Systems 1990-91, 1990, p. 60)
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Radar systems provide a wide spectrum of UAV
detection capability and often determine all information
required for weapon delivery. The primary disadvantage of
radar systems is that they are detectable by the enemy and
therefore, may not be suitable for clandestine operations.
b. Optical
Optical detection of UAVs is highly dependent on
environmental factors. Increased detection range is attained
by magnification which reduces the visual field-of-view,
decreasing surveillance area and increasing search time. Use
of visual sensors is also a very fatiguing and demanding human
task. Essentially, visual sensors are inefficient search
mechanisms. Given cuing by more efficient search sensors
however, visual sensors may be effective for UAV surveillance
and tracking. Detection ranges as great as 10 kilometers are
possible depending on UAV aspect and environmental conditions.
Visual sensors are passive and do not present any counter-
detection problems. (Dynetics, 1991, pp. 6-1 - 6-20)
c. FLIR
Infrared detection of UAVs is highly dependent on
environmental conditions and UAV temperature. This method
also places high demand on human operators. Narrow field-of-
view is required to achieve detection at ranges near 6
kilometers, making search area very small and search time
long. Wide field-of-view FLIR detection probably only yields
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ranges of 2-3 kilometers. FLIR is an inefficient search
sensor and may only be adequate for surveillance once cued by
other means. (Dynetics, 1991, pp. 4-1 - 4-18)
The use of multiple UAVs in a single mission must
also be considered. A master UAV may be used to provide
targeting information for other lethal UAVs. Multiple targets
for a single optical or FLIR sensor may overload the operator
and make anti-UAV defense very difficult. There should be
some method of ensuring that a single sensor has the
capability of tracking multiple targets or that sensors are
assigned to specific targets such that no target is
unaccounted for.
d. Infrared Search and Track (IRST)
IRST sensors operate much like scanning radar
systems without the benefit of range capability. This concept
essentially employs an infrared sensor linearly scanning a
circle. Multiple scans or sensors allow full 360 degree
coverage of 20 degrees of elevation. This reduces the human
limitations of FLIR systems and sophisticated filtering
techniques may provide reliable detection in clutter (Jane's
Battlefield Surveillance Systems 1990-91, 1990, p. 89). These
systems are in the developmental stage and may provide
detection ranges of 3-5 kilometers. (Dynetics, 1991, pp. 5-1
5-9)
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e. Passive Radio Frequency Intercept
UAV active emissions are exploitable f or detection
by ground forces. Real-time data links, radar altimeters,
jamming equipment, and radar sensors may be detectable. This
method provides bearing-only information but, resolution of
less than 15 degrees can be achieved within one second, 5
degrees within 10-20 seconds. It has been demonstrated that
some low band emitters such as data links are detectable at
ranges of 14 kilometers or greater. Active jamrmers and radars
may be detectable at much greater ranges. (Dynetics, 1991,
pp. 8-1 - 8-5)
Radio frequency intercept allows long range
passive detection of active UAVs. This method requires
minimal equipment and provides accurate bearing information
very rapidly; even short bursts of intermittent data link
transmission are detectable. Radio frequency intercept often
provides electronic characterization of the emitter allowing
platform classification by comparison to a library of emitter
characteristics. Radio frequency intercept provides an
excellent method of cuing other sensors such as FLIR or
optical devices. However, detection of UAV data link
transmissions is not completely reliable and may be totally
ineffective against UAVs with fiber optic data links.
42
4. Multi-sensor Information Fusion
The diversity of UAV configurations and capabilities
dictates that an effective anti-UAV system be capable of
exploiting multiple UAV detection media in any weather or
electronic environment. An anti-UAV system must also be able
to defeat UAVs cost effectively. It is difficult to justify
the use of the Patriot missile to destroy a UAV with
capabilities similar to the Pioneer system. In fact, inducing
"a Patriot missile battery to fire at a UAV may be considered
"a successful UAV mission. However, if a Patriot radar detects
"a UAV at long range and provides fire control data for attack
with a less expensive weapon, that may be considered a cost
effective anti-UAV operation.
Active UAVs are the most detectable; their radars,
jammers, or data links are detectable by radio frequency
intercept at long ranges. This suggests that a passive radio
intercept capability be part of any anti-UAV system. This
allows detection of some remotely-controlled real-time data
link capable UAVs which are the predominant and most time
critical threat to ground forces.
Electronically passive autonomous UAVs present a
challenge to anti-UAV systems since the UAVs do not produce
detectable radio frequency emissions. Optical or FLIR systems
are currently available for passive detection of these UAVs
and both methods are inefficient at wide area surveillance.
Since these UAVs are passive only, passive mobile ground
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forces are not usually at risk. However, active ground
systems such as radar sites or command and control centers, as
well as fixed location units such as logistics centers, are
subject to attack by passive UAVs searching for active
emitters or following pre-programmed routes to fixed
locations. Long range radar systems are appropriate for fixed
location high value units. Surveillance or battlefield radars
are appropriate for active ground forces which are relatively
mobile or require limited detection ranges.
Non-real-time data link reconnaissance UAVs do not
present immediate danger to mobile ground units and autonomous
lethal UAVs must close to short ranges to attack ground
forces. These situations allow short range detection and
attack of these types of UAVs. A system like the initially
proposed U.S. Army Air Defense Anti-Tank System (ADATS) uses
a combination of frequency-hopping search and acquisition
radar, FLIR, TV, and laser range finder sensors with laser
guided missiles and high-rate-of-fire guns to detect and
destroy airborne targets within a 25 kilometers radius, while
moving. UAVs may be detectable to distances of several
kilometers with a system such as this. ADATS also includes
the capability to operate six units in a master-slave function
in which only one unit needs active radar thereby minimizing
detectability while maximizing firepower (Walters, 1990, pp.
82-88). The Hughes Electro-Optical Tracking System (EOTS)
combines thermal imaging, TV, and high-repetition rate laser
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range finder equipment to provide a detection system which is
completely passive except for the laser, which is difficult to
detect (Aviation Week and Space Technology, 1992, p.6). A
system such as this may allow U.S. forces to detect UAVs, as
well as other aircraft, without significant risk of counter-
detection.
Thus, an effective anti-UAV system must include both
passive and active sensors and be capable of transfer and
receipt of data to and from other sensors and weapons
platforms. The system must include highly mobile elements
capable of protecting other mobile ground units from UAVs.
Modular sensor and weapon capability will facilitate tailoring
the system to the predominant threat.
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IV. ANTI-UAV YPERVELOCITY ROCKET WEAPONS
A. BACKGROUND
Hypervelocity rockets are similar to conventional rockets,
but they travel at a higher speed. The Persuader 2.75 inch
hypervelocity rocket travels approximately twice as fast as
the conventional Hydra-70 2.75 inch rocket. High speed
increases effectiveness in two ways. First, a less
sophisticated fire control system is required since the time
between launch and impact is less than half the time of
existing rockets, allowing essentially a point and shoot
capability. The fire control system must determine elevation
and lead angles. The shorter time of flight reduces the
probability that the target will successfully evade the
projectile by maneuvering. Secondly, hypervelocity
projectiles cause more damage than do equal-sized conventional
projectiles because of their higher penetrator kinetic energy
resulting from greater velocities. Penetrator kinetic energy
is approximately four times that of conventional rockets. The
result is a higher probability of kill given a single
penetrator hit. Hypervelocity rockets also provide
significantly longer maximum engagement ranges. (United
Applied Technologies, 1991)
46
A hypervelocity rocket air defense weapon has been
proposed for both ground forces and aircraft. Such a system
may provide an effective anti-UAV capability. The weapon in
this system is a hypervelocity rocket which is launched at the
target, then detonates and disperses a large number of
tungsten flechette penetrators some distance from the target
(Figure 3).
The base design incorporates a rocket that detonates and
disperses or sprays flechette penetrators passively at booster
burnout. An optional electronic timer facilitates controlling
the distance that the rocket travels before dispersing
penetrators based on the target's range from the rocket. The
axial distance from the target at which the rocket detonates
and disperses its penetrators, called detonation distance and
denoted by z, determines the radius of the penetrator spray
pattern when it reaches the target (Figure 4). It may be
feasible to incorporate a target detecting device in the
rocket to precisely control detonation distance. Detonation
distance may be optimally selected to maximize the probability
that the rocket kills the UAV. If detonation distance is
chosen too small, it becomes more likely that the penetrator
spray is not dispersed enough to cover the target. If the
detonation distance is chosen too large, the penetrator spray
may be so sparse that no penetrators impact the target









Figure 4 Penetrator Spray Cone Geometry
B. WEAPON LETHALITY
A lethal air defense weapon system is one that can
encounter, engage, and kill aircraft. Lethality is the
probability that the weapon system can kill the aircraft. Air
defense lethality is the complement of aircraft survivability.
Weapon lethality is a function of target susceptibility and
vulnerability. (Ball, 1992, pp. 5-8)
Susceptibility is the aircraft's inability to avoid being
hit (Ball, 1985, p. 223). The following is a list of some
factors which influence susceptibility:
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"* environment





Vulnerability is the target's inability to withstand hits from
a weapon (Ball, 1985, p. 135). Some factors which influence
target vulnerability are:
"* critical component redundancy
"* critical component location
"* critical component shielding
"* critical component separation
"* critical component elimination
"* active and passive damage suppression.
1. UAV Vulnerability
Vulnerability is measured as the probability that the
UAV is killed given a hit by the weapon. Vulnerability
reduction is usually not incorporated extensively in UAV
design because of cost constraints. The UAV is generally
thought to be expendable and, therefore, survivability
enhancement measures are often much less extensive than those
for manned aircraft. UAVs typically have little redundancy in
their design and critical components are not separated due to
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space, weight, and center of gravity constraints, making them
very vulnerable to attack. It is considered to be likely that
hypervelocity rocket penetrators are large enough and travel
fast enough that a single penetrator impacting the UAV
vulnerable area will destroy the UAV or its sensor (United
Applied Technologies, 1991); that is UAVs will be very
vulnerable to hypervelocity rocket penetrators with a
P{kill I hit} - 1. Thus in this thesis, given that the UAV
can be detected and tracked, the weapon lethality is assumed
to be determined by the probability that at least one
flechette penetrator will hit the UAV vulnerable area. This
analysis may be easily modified for study of weapons which
must provide multiple penetrator hits to kill the target.
2. UAV Susceptibility
UAV susceptibility is measured as the probability of
hit, which includes the probability of acquisition, detection,
identification, tracking, launch, guidance, and detonation.
Detection, acquisition, identification, and tracking have been
addressed in classified UAV survivability studies (see
bibliography), and hypervelocity rockets do not receive
inf light guidance. The present analysis assumes that the
rocket is successfully launched at a tracked target, but with
some error due to tracking error and round-to-round
dispersion. Thus, the probability of hit or damage is assumed
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to be determined by the target characteristics, penetrator
spray, and weapon delivery error.
The proposed hypervelocity rocket weapon system has
demonstrated high reliability. More than 600 rocket motors
were tested with no failures (United Applied Technologies,
1991). Thus, the issue to be examined in this thesis is the
air defense endgame or the determination of the probability
that at least one flechette penetrator will hit the target
vulnerable area given a successful rocket launch.
C. ENDGAME
1. Weapon Delivery Error
The fire control solution for a target UAV will have
inherent error and each rocket will detonate at a point some
distance from its intended aim point due to round-to-round
dispersion. Thus, the rocket will be delivered in the
proximity of the target with some error. These errors include
the effects of tracking error, wind effects on the projectile,
and unpredicted target maneuvering. It is reasonable to
assume that the rocket will reach the target's range with
error components in azimuth and elevation, in the X and Y
directions respectively (Figure 5). These error components
are most often quantified as angular errors. It is assumed
here that elevation and azimuth errors, denoted by A and E,
are independently and identically normally distributed with











Figure 5 Weapon Delivery Error Diagram
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are circularly normal. These errors may be combined to yield
a radial miss distance T, where T2 = A2+E2 is the sum of two
independent, identically distributed, squared normal random
variables, thus T2/a2 is a Chi-Square random variable with 2
degrees of freedom.
A model for weapon delivery error in spherical
coordinates is as follows. When considered in spherical
coordinates, the fire control azimuth and elevation error
components are angular errors from the ideal aim direction,
denoted by oA and Y., (Figure 5). It is assumed that the
weapon delivery is unbiased; mean angular error components are
zero. The radial miss distance at the target range is
determined by the target range and angular error components;
A = Dtanot, and E = DtanaE. The radial miss distance at the
target's range is a linear function of the engagement range,
D, and the tangent of angular error (Figure 6). Typical
weapon system angular errors are on the order of a few
milliradians, as estimated by the U.S. Army Missile Command
Advanced Systems Concepts Office. The tangent of these angles
is very closely approximated by the angles (thus, A - DaA and
E - DE). Angular error is an input parameter in the models
developed in this thesis; the models are applicable for
angular errors that are of magnitude such that the angle
provides a close approximation of the tangent of the angle.










Figure 6 Polar Coordinate View of Endgame Geometry
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distance D that the rocket travels to the target and the
azimuth and elevation angular variances. Their approximations
are: Var(A) - D2Var(aA) and Var(E) - D2Var(a.). It is assumed
that the azimuth and elevation error components may be modeled
as independent and identically distributed normal random
variables therefore, Var(A) = Var(E) = D2 a, 2 . Thus, T 2 +(D 2 O,2 )
is distributed as a Chi-square random variable with two
degrees of freedom which is equivalent to an exponential
random variable with rate parameter X =
2. Reference System
The point of interest in this scenario is the instant
when the penetrators reach the range of the target, where they
either hit or miss the target vulnerable area. This is the
terminal phase of the lethal air defense endgame. The center
of the target vulnerable area is chosen as the origin of a
spherical coordinate reference system (Figure 7). Detonation
distance, z, is measured from the target center to the rocket
position along the positive Z axis. The plane determined by
z=O, at the target's position, determines a polar coordinate
endgame reference system. It is assumed that the detonation
distance can be controlled. Because of the radial error
mentioned earlier, the center of the penetrator spray zone
will be offset from the origin by random radial distance T.
The amount of the penetrator spray which covers the target
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depends only on the radial separation and is independent of
angular offset if both areas are assumed to be circular.
r - penetrator spray radius
S- UAV vulnerable radius SinoS both arem are cktl amoui, of
h~dbp ntw of angle bhd depens ona onMadWdi~timoT.
T measured fm cent•e of Twgt Ama
Figure 7 Polar Coordinate Reference System
3. UAV Vulnerable Area
The UAV critical components are assumed to occupy an
approximately spherical volume at the center of the UAV.
Therefore, the UAV vulnerable area is circular when viewed
from any aspect. Since UAVs have small vulnerable areas
relative to the size of the flechette penetrator spray, it is
assumed that the projectile penetrator spray disk either
completely covers or completely misses the UAV vulnerable area
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Figure 8 Endgame Analysis: Two Cases Considered
analysis by excluding the possibility that the projectile disk
partially overlaps the target vulnerable area. Thus, two
exhaustive and mutually exclusive cases are parameterized by:
P1 = probability that penetrator spray completely covers the
target vulnerable area and P. = probability that projectile
area completely misses the target vulnerable area. A more
refined analysis is possible, but appears to be unnecessary.
Probability bounds can be constructed, but are not studied in
this thesis.
4. Cookie-Cutter Model: Penetrator Probability of Hit
It is next assumed that the penetrators are uniformly
distributed across the penetrator spray disk when it reaches
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the range of the target. If a cookie-cutter damage function
is assumed, a penetrator which hits the target vulnerable area
causes damage with probability one, and a penetrator which
misses the target vulnerable area causes no damage. The
cookie-cutter damage function is given by (4.1) (Eckler and
Burr, 1972, p. 43), where (x,,yp) represents the penetrator's
coordinates, (Xt,yt) represents the center of the target
vulnerable area, and r, represents the target's vulnerable
radius. All coordinate measurements are made from the origin
on the actual path of the rocket at the target's range.
d[I(xp,yp) , (x,,y)]= 1 ifV(x,-xp) 2 + (yt-yp)2 g r, (4.1)
0, otherwise
If the penetrator spray disk completely misses the
target vulnerable area, no penetrators impact the target
vulnerable area. If the projectile disk completely covers the
vulnerable area, each penetrator has an equally likely,
independent probability of impacting the target vulnerable
area. This probability is determined by the ratio of target
vulnerable area to projectile spray disk area. This ratio
yields probability p = wrr 2 + r2 = r, 2 + r 2 ; it is assumed
here that rp is greater than r,, which is totally realistic for
most of the projectile trajectory. Hence, given that the
projectile disk completely covers the vulnerable area, the
number of penetrators which impact the vulnerable area is
binomially distributed with probability p and number of trials
n, the number of penetrators. The number of penetrators which
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miss the target is binomially distributed with probability 1-p
and number of trials or penetrators n. Thus, if each
projectile contains n penetrators, the probability that no
penetrators impact the target vulnerable area given complete
overlap exists, denoted by P0 , is determined by (4.2).
2 
.P0 = ( 1 - -~-r ) (4.2)
5. Probability That Penetrator Spray Covers Target
As stated above, only the cases of complete overlap
and complete miss are considered. Edge effects, that should
be considered when partial overlap exists, are excluded based
on the assumption that UAV vulnerable areas are small relative
to penetrator spray pattern size and error offset of pattern
center. Calculation of the probability that the penetrator
disk completely overlaps the vulnerable area, P,, is given by
the probability that the radial miss distance (T) is less than
or equal to the penetrator spray disk radius (rp), as in
(4.3a). The probability that the projectile spray disk misses
the target vulnerable area is the complement, P11 = I-P, as in
(4.3b).
24 D• (4.3a)
P, = P (T : rp) = 1 - e D20a2
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2PIZ = P (T > rp) = e 2 D 202 (4.3b)
6. Probability of No Penetrator Hits
There are two ways which the UAV vulnerable area may
receive no penetrator impacts. First, the penetrator spray
area may completely miss the target vulnerable area.
Secondly, the areas may overlap but all penetrators miss the
vulnerable area. Thus, the probability of no penetrator hits
given detonation distance z equals the probability of no
overlap plus the probability of complete overlap times the
probability of n misses given overlap. Combining the
probability equations for both cases, Pno-iz = P11 + P1 P0,
yields (4.4).
Pnohits I z e 2 + ( e - e 21,) (1 - (4 4
The geometry of Figure 4 shows that the penetrator
spray radius rp = ztano. Note that the + subscript means that
the term is set to zero if the argument is negative. Thus,
substitution for rp yields (4.5).
Pno hits I z =
1 z 2 tan2  I z 2 tan2 2
2 D1222 2 D 2 o02  V 2 (4.5)
e +(1e ( z2tan2o
It is assumed that the penetrator spray zone is
conical with fixed half angle (•). The probability that a
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penetrator hits the target depends on tano. Various values of
0 were examined and the maximum probability of at least one
hit was obtained at an angle of approximately 15 degrees.
Rocket design constraints may dictate this angle. Letting
constant c, = tan2 o yields (4.6). It is assumed that
_2 c, z_ 2  1 c 1 z
2
Pno hits I z = e + (1 - e ) (1 2 )+ (4.6)
C ZC
detonation distance z depends on engagement range D; the
probability of at least one hit is determined for a specific
scenario in which engagement range is constant. Therefore,
let c2 = c, + D2 or 2 . Thus, c 2 = tan2o + (D2 U2 .) and
substitution yields (4.7). The probability of at least one
- 1 2z2 2 2z2
Pnohits I z = e + (I - e ) (C - V ) (4.7)
C1 Z2
hit is equal to one minus the probability of no hits. Thus,
the probability of at least one hit is given by (4.8). This
-!c 2 z2 -c~z2 r2 2 n
p(z) = P1 hitlz = 1 - e 2 + (1 - e 2 U -( V) (4.8)
C1 Z2
may be maximized with respect to detonation distance (z) and
will be a function of engagement range (D), a characteristic
of the scenario, and spray cone half-angle (0), a
characteristic of the weapon design. In order to do this, one
approach is to set the derivative with respect to z for this
probability equal to zero to obtain an equation for optimal
detonation distance. The solution must be checked to verify
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a maximum and not a minimum. However, in the present problem
this procedure does not yield a closed-form solution for
optimal detonation distance. As an alternative, the
probability of at least one hit as a function of detonation
distance (z) may be calculated using a computer program such
as that in Appendix A. The optimal detonation distance for a
specific scenario may also be determined by a non-linear
optimization program such as that in Appendix B. A graph of
the probability of at least one hit is also important; it
shows that the function p(z) is somewhat flat near the
maximum, particularly at longer ranges. The graph reveals
that the probability of kill curve, as a function of
detonation distance, falls off sharply from its maximum value
for short range engagements.
7. Optimal Detonation Distance Dependence on Range
'ince the variance of radial error components (D2a,"2)
is proportional to target range D, the optimal detonation
distance (z) is dependent on the range from the weapon launch
platform to the target. The probability at least one
penetrator impacts the UAV vulnerable area may be computed for
a specific size UAV at a given range and plotted as a function
of detonation distance. Plots for different ranges reveal how
the optimal detonation distance varies with range for a given
size of UAV.
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Figure 9 shows these plots for a UAV with a 5 square
meter vulnerable area engaged by a hypervelocity rocket weapon
with these characteristics: n=100 penetrators, a, = 5
milliradians for angular error deviations, and 0=15 degree
dispersion cone half-angle. These data are completely
hypothetical and do not accurately reflect actual UAV
vulnerable areas or hypervelocity rocket performance
characteristics. This prevents disclosure of classified and
proprietary data. Optimal detonation distances may be
tabulated for various ranges and target vulnerable areas.
This data may be stored in a fire control computer for rapid
determination of fuzing time delay which provides the optimal
detonation distance for a given engagement.
These tabular data may be used to set rocket fuse
delay to maximize the effectiveness of anti-UAV hypervelocity
rockets. The fire control computer will estimate the target's
range. However, the UAV vulnerable area will not be as
readily available and is aspect dependent. The operator may
be able to input a UAV vulnerable area estimate based on
intelligence or visual detection. In the absence of any
intelligence data or visual detection, an expected UAV
vulnerable area may be used. The UAV aspect presented to the
weapon may be estimated by the relative closure of the UAV to
the tracking sensor. It may be possible to provide the fire
control system with a library of UAV physical and electronic
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Figure 9 Cookie-Cutter Probability of Kill as a Function
of Detonation Distance
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characteristics which would allow automated target recognition
equipment to provide the necessary parameters to retrieve
aspect dependent UAV vulnerable area estimates from memory.
This will provide an automated means of accurately estimating
the UAV vulnerable area required to set detonation distance
for optimal attack of UAVs. Figure 10 shows how optimal
detonation distance and maximum probability of kill vary with
target vulnerable area for a target range of 1 kilometer. It
is shown that small targets are best attacked with relatively
short detonation distances. This probably results because the
shorter detonation distances provide a more dense penetrator
spray required to ensure that a small target is killed.
D. JUSTIFICATION OF ASSUMPTIONS
For the hypothetical engagement discussed previously, the
ratio of penetrator spray radius to UAV vulnerable area radius
varies from about 6.7 at an engagement range (D) of 0.5
kilometers to 21.2 at an engagement range of 5 kilometers.
The radial miss deviation varies from 2.5 meters at an
engagement range of 0.5 kilometers to 25 meters at an
engagement range of 5 kilometers as compared to a vulnerable
radius of 1.26 meters. These data support the assumption that
UAV vulnerable radius is much smaller than the penetrator disk
radius and radial miss distance, justifying exclusion of
partial coverage of the target vulnerable area from
consideration.
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Figure 10 Probability of Kill and Optimal Detonation
Distance as a Function of Vulnerable Area
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E. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
The probability that a UAV is killed by a hypervelocity
rocket depends on the UAV vulnerable area presented to the
penetrator. Examination of probability of kill as a function
of the difference between estimated and actual target
vulnerable area, when the detonation distance is set to
maximize probability of kill for the estimated vulnerable
area, reveals the sensitivity of the probability of kill to
errors in the UAV vulnerable area estimates.
Figure 11 shows the percent degradation of probability of
kill from the maximum value for engagement ranges of 0.5 and
3 kilometers. This plot reveals that the model is relatively
insensitive to vulnerable area estimate errors at long range;
the probability of kill is degraded less than 3.5 percent for
the 3 kilometer engagement. However, the probability of kill
may be decreased by as much as 8 percent at an engagement
range of 0.5 kilometer. Accurate vulnerable area estimates
for close-in UAV engagements may provide significant
improvements in weapon lethality. It appears that
underestimating the target vulnerable area reduces lethality
more than overestimating.
These data are hypothetical; however, the same type of
analysis may be performed for real data. An analysis such as
this would reveal whether it is more detrimental to err on the
high or low side; asymmetry would suggest hedging by use of a
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biased estimate. More extensive sensitivity analysis may also
reveal, as in the case of the 3 kilometer engagement for these
data, that the vulnerable area estimate is not extremely
critical for weapon lethality in certain scenarios. Since the
weapon lethality is relatively sensitive to vulnerable area
errors for short range engagements, UAV vulnerability data are
critical to the optimal design of an effective hypervelocity
rocket weapon for close-in defense. This may indicate that a
UAV vulnerable area estimate biased for overestimation
provides a more robust probability of killing the UAV. This
indicates that the fire control computer should determine
detonation distance based on top, bottom, or side aspect
vulnerable areas rather than front or back aspect areas which
are much smaller and could provide an underestimation of the
UAV vulnerable area for the aspect presented to the rocket.
70
V. DIFFUSE GAUSSIAN MODEL
A. BACKGROUND
Cookie-cutter damage models, such as that of the previous
chapter, are based on the assumption that damage occurs only
if the damage mechanism penetrates within a rigidly specified
radial distance from the center of the target vulnerable area.
The general requirement for a damage function is that it
be non-increasing from one to zero along any radius outward
from the origin (Eckler and Burr, 1972, p. 43). The diffuse
Gaussian damage function, also known as the Von Neumann or
Carleton damage function, is a common alternative to the
cookie-cutter function. The diffuse Gaussian damage function
is given by (5.1). Here r represents the radial distance from
d(r) = e 2b
2
the center of the target to the penetrator position at the
range of the target. Note that an asymmetric damage function
may be used in the following analysis with no difficulty.
Unlike the cookie-cutter function, the diffuse Gaussian
function provides a positive probability of damage for a
penetrator impact at any finite distance away from the center
of the target; however, the damage assessed by (5.1) falls off
nearly to zero very quickly with radial distance from the
target center. The diffuse Gaussian function is based on the
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assumption that targets are more likely to be damaged if hit
near some vital point and less likely to be damaged if hit
further from away from this point. This is a more realistic
model since most targets do not usually have all vulnerable
components concentrated in a spherical volume. Figure 12
shows a comparison of the cookie-cutter and diffuse Gaussian
damage functions.
The parameter b is, by convention, determined such that
the total damage possible is equated to the presented area of
the target. With r8 equal to the radius of the presented
target area which is assumed to be circular, b = rq, + 12
follows from (5.2) (Ball, 1985, p. 268).
2'X - r2
f f e b2 r dr dO = AP = , ap2 = 27rb 2  (5.2)
0 0
The cookie-cutter model of the previous chapter assumes a
circular vulnerable area. Selection of parameter b such that
the damage function integrates to the vulnerable area, vice
presented area, yields b = r,+12. This allows direct
comparison of the two models.
For targets such as manned aircraft, the critical
components are likely to be separated Ey relatively large
distances. The use of a parameter b based on presented area
will be more appropriate for analysis of this type of endgame.
However, since UAVs are much smaller than traditional targets,
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Figure 12 Damage Function Comparison
approximations of the endgame. The assumption that b = rv÷2
will be used in the remainder of this chapter.
B. ASSUMPTIONS
1. Target
The diffuse Gaussian damage function does not assume
that the target has a spherical critical volume, which implies
a circular vulnerable area. The diffuse Gaussian function
allows damage to the target even for impacts outside a cookie-
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cutter vulnerable radius. This is probably a more realistic
representation of the probability of damage to an aircraft.
Critical systems such as fuel tanks, sensors, engines, and
propellers or rotors are usually located in various sections
of the aircraft. Since UAVs are typically much smaller than
manned aircraft, center of gravity or weight and balance
constraints are much more stringent. Most UAV critical
components are probably located near the aircraft's center of
gravity but some, such as a propeller, are likely to be
separated from this point. Thus, the diffuse Gaussian damage
function may allow more realistic modelling of the
hypervelocity rocket versus UAV endgame than does the cookie-
cutter damage function.
2. Penetrator Spray
The cookie-cutter model assumes that the hypervelocity
rocket flechette penetrator spray is conical in shape with
deterministic half-angle. It was also assumed that the
penetrators were uniformly distributed across the disk defined
by the leading edge of the cone. However, it may be that in
a real weapon the penetrators will be highly concentrated near
the center of the spray cone and sparsely concentrated at the
fringes of the spray cone. The spread of the penetrators, the
bivariate deviation, should be a function of the detonation
distance and the spray cone half-angle. Thus, ap = f(z,O).
It is therefore assumed that penetrators are spread across the
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spray cone according to a bivariate normal density around the
axis of the cone along the actual rocket path. The position
of a penetrator (x.,y.), relative to the rocket spray pattern
center at (0,0), is assumed to be distributed according to the
bivariate normal density given by (5.3).
p (xl, ' = e 2 o2 & 2 (5.3)
3. Weapon Delivery Error
It is assumed that the rocket will be delivered to a
position separated from the actual target location by a radial
and angular error. As in the cookie-cutter model, this error
is comprised of normal components in elevation and azimuth and
is characterized by angular errors. As in the previous
chapter, the squared radial error or miss distance divided by
error component variance is modeled as a Chi-square random
variable. The miss distance component standard deviations are
approximated by Da,.
C. PROBABILITY OF DAMAGE CALCULATION
The diffuse Gaussian damage function, based on the radial
distance between the flechette penetrator and the center of
the UAV vulnerable area, is given by (5.4).
. 1 ( ( x p - x ,) + ( y _ y ,) )
2 ' b= (5.4)
P damage I (x,, y.), (x,,y,) = e
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Integration over the range of penetrator locations (xp,yp),
as in (5.5), yields the probability of damage given the target
center location coordinates (,Yt).
P[ damage I (xt, Yt)] =
__ x- +" 2- (3-:-YT)e 2 o2  (5.5)
e-. , -- b2 e k' dy
If each integral is multiplied and divided by (2w)'4, then
each integral amounts to a convolution of two normal random
variables. The first integral has normal random variables xp
and (x, - xP) with variances aUp2 and b 2 respectively; the second
integral has the same normal random variables for the y
components of the endgame geometry. Thus, carrying over the
formulae for convolution of normal random variables allows the
simple explicit equation to be written down, resulting in
(5.6). But, C2 + y2 = T 2 is the radial distance from the
i (xt 2 +YC
2 )
b 2  e 2 (b2 + "2 ) (5.6)
PdamaeI (xtyt) b 2 + 2
actual aim point to the target center located at (xt,yt).
Substitution of T provides (5.7). It is assumed that each
1 T
2
PdamgeIT b 2  e 2 b 2+o0 (5.7)
penetrator has an identically distributed, equally likely
probability of damaging the target. Therefore, the
probability that n penetrators cause no damage given the
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actual target center at (Ox,yt) is given by (5.8). The
- T 2
b 2  2 b 2+ab2  ) (5.8)!)no damage I T 1 b2 +0 Pe2 e
unconditional probability of no damage is calculated by
multiplying the conditional probability by the radial miss
distance distribution and integrating over the range of radial
miss errors. Again, T2 +D2 a 2 is distributed as a Chi-square
random variable with two degrees of freedom.
Pno damage =
-1
-_ _ 2 (5.9)
f 2 e b2+ n -e D2-- 2 1 d( 7eb 2 + a 2  2 D12 Ca.2o p
The binomial series expansion for a factor raised to the
n± power is as given in (5.10). The conditional probability
n n
(a + b) n = (17) a' b = j (n ) bj an-j (5.10)
of no damage raised to the power n may be replaced by its
binomial series expansion. This, combined with a convenient
change of variable, where w = XT2, yields (5.11).
:no damage
-w
(n) -b b2 -Q2 (5.11)
0 J 2 + U2 De20 a 2
Rearrangement of sunmmation and integration terms is given in
(5.12) and completion of the integration yields the
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Pno damage -n _b • -,,(__._ -- (5.12)
0 -b'  1 De b2 4up' D2o 2 dw
i40 3J b 2 + CJ 2 D G2a 2
P a 0
probability that the target is undamaged, given by (5.13).
Pno dmg& n -b )j b2+, 
2
p) = ) Ii(' Pi- ) (5.13)
-nog (b 2 + jD 2 U92 + b2 + (I,2
The probability that the target is damaged by one or more




~~1hi (n1) (fl 2 M, ) (5.14)S( b 2 + aP2 jD 2oC 2  + b 2 + Cr 2
D. OPTIMAL DETONATION DISTANCE
Parameters b = r,--2 and a. = 5 milliradians have been
determined previously based on convention and the engagement
geometry. The only parameter which depends on detonation
distance is the bivariate standard deviation of penetrator
spread, ;. It is reasonable to assume that the penetrator
spray cone will be fairly well-defined. It is likely that
most of the penetrators will fall within the circular cookie-
cutter penetrator disk area, determined by ztano. Thus, it is
reasonable to assume that two standard deviations of
penetrator spray equal the cookie-cutter penetrator spray
radius; 2 ap = ztan4 or ap = Mztano. Substitution for
parameters b, a. 2 , and op in the equation for probability of
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maximized with respect to detonation distance z. A closed
form solution for optimal detonation distance has not been
found. However, plotting probability of kill at a given
engagement range as a function of detonation distance reveals
the maximum probability of damage and the optimal detonation
distance for a given engagement. Figure 13 displays the
probability of kill as a function of detonation distance for
the hypothetical weapon described in the previous chapter,
Engagement of a UAV with a 5 m2 vulnerable area is considered.
E. COMPARISON TO COOKIE-CUTTER DAMAGE MODEL
It is expected that the cookie-cutter and diffuse Gaussian
models should provide similar results if the penetrator spray
bivariate normal variance is chosen such that most of the
penetrators are located within the deterministic circular
spray area of the cookie-cutter model. These models should be
roughly equivalent if the diffuse penetrator spray deviation
is selected such that twice the deviation is equal to the
cookie-cutter uniform spray radius. Under this condition,
almost 96 percent of the penetrators are expected to be
located within the circular cookie-cutter spray area. Figure
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Figure 13 Diffuse Gaussian Probability of Kill as a
Function of Detonation Distance
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14 shows a comparison of results from the two models for a 1.0
kilometer engagement range. The two models provide almost
identical results for maximum probability of kill and optimal
detonation distance. Table IV shows a comparison of results
for the hypothetical engagements analyzed.
TABLE IV COMPARISON OF MODEL RESULTS
Cookie Diffused
Cutter Gaussian
UAV UAV Optimal Optimal
Area Range Pdamqte z P•dae z
(M 2 ) (km) (m) (m)
5 5 0.090 79 0.090 79
4 5 0.075 74 0.075 75
3 5 0.053 69 0.058 70
2 5 0.041 63 0.041 63
5 4 0.130 70 0.130 71
4 4 0.108 67 0.109 67
3 4 0.086 62 0.086 62
2 4 0.361 56 0.061 56
5 3 0.201 61 0.202 61
4 3 0.171 58 0.171 58
3 3 0.137 54 0.137 54
2 3 0.098 48 0.099 49
5 2 0.349 50 0.351 50
4 2 0.303 47 0.304 48
3 2 0.250 44 0.240 44
2 2 0.186 40 0.187 40
5 1 0.695 35 0.701 36
4 1 0.638 33 0.643 34
3 1 0.563 31 0.567 32
2 1 0.459 28 0.462 28
5 0.5 0.946 25 0.953 26
4 0.5 0.921 24 0.929 24
3 0.5 0.880 22 0.888 22
2 0.5 0.804 20 0.812 20
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Comparison of Damage Model Results
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As expected, the diffuse Gaussian model provides higher
probabilities of kill for detonation distances other than the
optimal detonation distance. This occurs because all
penetrators have some non-zero probability of damage in the
diffuse target model. Penetrators which impact outside the
circular vulnerable area have zero probability of damage in
the cookie-cutter target model. However, botl models show
virtually the same optimal detonation distance which maximizes
the probability of killing the UAV.
F. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
As was true for the cookie-cutter model, the diffuse
Gaussian model is relatively insensitive to target vulnerable
area estimate error for long range engagements. However, the
diffuse Gaussian model is less sensitive to vulnerable area
estimate error than is the cookie-cutter endgame model,
especially for short range UAV engagements. The diffuse
Gaussian model shows only half of the percent probability of
kill degradation that the cookie-cutter model does for a 0.5
kilometer engagement range (Figure 15). Figures 16 and 17
compare the two models at engagement ranges of 3 and 0.5
kilometers respectively. Live fire experiments might be
conducted and examined to determine which model most
realistically characterizes the sensitivity to UAV vulnerable
area estimate error.
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Diffused Gaussian Probability of Kill
Sensitivity to Vulnerable Area Estimate
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Figure 15 Diffused Gaussian Model Sensitivity to UAV
Vulnerable Area Estimate Error
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Probability of Kill Sensitivity
Model Comparison
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Figure 16 Model Sensitivity Comparison (0.5 km)
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G. PENETRATOR DISPERSION PARAMETER SELECTION
The penetrator dispersion parameter, cp, was set to
M(ztano) to make the two models roughly equivalent for
validation of the diffuse Gaussian model. However, the
dispersion of the penetrator spray may be somewhat
controllable by changing the rocket design. For this reason,
other values for the dispersion parameter were Analyzed to
allow comparison. Results for dispersion deviations of
14(ztan ), 3ý(ztano), and (ztano) reveal that there is an
absolute maximum probability of damage attainable for a given
engagement. It also shows that optimal detonation distance
decreases as dispersion increases. In fact, optimal
detonation distance is linearly proportional to the inverse of
dispersion deviation.
This relationship highlights the importance of careful
selection of penetrator spray cone half-angle. Dispersion
deviation depends on the tangent of this angle as well as
detonation distance. Controlled selection of spray cone half-
angle will ensure that the optimal detonation distance is
small enough so that the penetrators have enough energy to
sufficiently damage the UAV on impact. As penetrators travel
farther, aerodynamic drag may excessively reduce their kinetic
energy.
It is important to note that the detonation distance is
also constrained by the maximum distance which the flechette
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penetrators can travel after detonation and still maintain
kinetic energy sufficient to kill the target. This constraint
is not considered in this analysis. If the optimal detonation
distance predicted by these models exceeds this kinetic
limitation of the penetrators, the detonation distance should
be chosen to ensure that sufficient energy is retained to kill




A. UAVS ARE A THMT TO GROUND FORCES
UAVs are an important asset to battlefield commanders.
They provide timely reconnaissance information and targeting
data. Lethal UAVs also serve as force multipliers by
supplementing and complementing manned aircraft. These
factors make UAVs such a desirable asset that U.S. forces are
likely to face hostile UAVs in future conflicts. U.S. surface
forces must be able to efficiently defeat hostile UAVs in
order to maintain tactical advantage in a conflict.
Since UAVs are a threat to U.S. forces, troops should be
trained to detect and identify them. U.S. personnel should
become familiar with enemy UAV appearances, capabilities, and
tactics. It is essential to understand how and why UAVs are
employed. Both ground troops and naval units should become
familiar with the anti-UAV capabilities of their weapons so
they may make efficient use of resources in combating UAVs.
This will also reveal strengths and deficiencies of existing
systems in an anti-UAV role. Evaluation of current systems
will also help to determine whether new systems are required
to provide an adequate anti-UAV capability.
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B. TOOLS FOR HYPERVELOCITY ROCKET LETHALITY ASSESSMENT
Hypervelocity rockets promise to provide a viable anti-UAV
weapon. Probability models of the lethal air defense endgame
provide a means of predicting the lethality of hypervelocity
rockets for various engagement scenarios. The measure of
effectiveness considered in this analysis is the probability
that one or more flechette penetrators, from a single rocket,
hit the UAV vulnerable area. It is assumed that a single
penetrator hit to the UAV vulnerable area will kill the
target. These models may easily be adapted to study weapons
which have a probability of kill given hit less than one which
would require multiple hits to destroy the target with
acceptable confidence. Both models allow determination of the
optimal detonation distance, which provides this maximum
probability of killing the UAV.
A cookie-cutter damage probability model was first used to
describe the air defense endgame with simplifying assumptions.
A diffused Gaussian damage model was then used to provide a
more realistic representation of the endgame. The models
provide similar results for targets with small, concentrated
vulnerable areas. However, the diffused Gaussian model more
realistically models targets which have less concentrated
vulnerable components. These models may be used to design an
effective anti-UAV hypervelocity rocket weapon and compare
weapon lethality to that of guns and missiles.
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It is shown that controlled selection of the detonation
distance of the rocket may significantly improve anti-UAV
effectiveness. The analysis in this thesis provides the basis
for developing an optimal fuzing algorithm which determines
the appropriate fuzing time delay to provide the optimal
detonation distance for a given scenario.
Sensitivity analysis shows that is beneficial to
overestimate the UAV vulnerable area to provide a more robust
fuzing algorithm. Underestimating the UAV vulnerable area
provides significant degradation of the anti-UAV
effectiveness. UAV vulnerable areas are extremely aspect
dependent, for most UAVs the front and rear of the vehicle
present very small vulnerable areas, the sides present larger
vulnerable areas, and the top and bottom provide the largest
vulnerable areas. Rocket fuzing should be based on vulnerable
areas corresponding to one of the larger aspects, side or
bottom, which will likely be presented to the rocket. Basing
rocket fuzing on frontal or rear vulnerable areas may
significantly reduce the probability of destroying the UAV
from the maximum probability of kill attained with perfect
vulnerable area estimation.
C. FURTHER ANALYSIS
Data from UAV signature measurements and live-fire
experiments may be used to determine realistic parameters for
the models presented in this thesis. This will allow use of
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the models in simulations to further study the lethality of
hypervelocity rockets.
The possibility of steering penetrator spray from missiles
is currently being researched. This capability would increase
the lethality of these weapons since the destructive energy of
the damage mechanisms would be focused on the target. It may
also be beneficial to develop a capability to steer the
hypervelocity rocket penetrator spray directly toward the
target. Further analysis may be appropriate to determine the
feasibility and payoff of such a modification.
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APPENDIX A COOKIE- CUTTER XODEL APL COM:PUTER PROGRAM
[(0 X÷COOKIE
E1l A PROGRAMMER: LT JOSEPH .. OEEL. USN
[2) A US NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
(3) a JANUARY 1992
(4) A
(5) A THIS PROGRAM COMPUTES THE PROBABILITY rTAT AT LEAST ONE
(6) a FLECHETTE PENETRATOR FROM A HYPERVELOCITY ROCKEr BITS
(7) a THE TARGET VULNERABLE AREA AS BASED ON A COOKIE-CUTTER MODEL OF THE
Ea] a TARGET AS MODELED IN CHAPTER IV OF TrHIS ITESIS
(93 A
(10o A OUTPUT MATRIX IS INITIALIZED FOR DATA STORAGE
E113 X+3 91p0
E123 A
C133 a DETONATION DISTANCE IS VARIED FROM 10 TO 100 MEETRS
1143 Z+9+191
(153 A
C16) A DATA INPUT
(17) a USeR MUST INPUT:
C18] a TARGET VULNERABLE AREA (SQUARE METERS)
(19) A DISPERSION CONE HALF ANGLE (DEGREES)
[203 A NUMBER OF FLECHETTES PER ROCKET
E21) a TARGET RANGE WHEN ENGAGED (KZLOMNTERS)
(223 a ANGULAR DELIVERY ERROR (MILLIRADIANS)
(233 A
(24) INPUT:'********* DATA INPUT **********'
(25) 'INPUT THE TARGET VULNERABLE AREA (SQUARE METERS)'
C26) VULAREA÷O
[27) 'INPUT THE DISPERSION CONE HALF ANGLE IN DEGREES'
(28) PHID÷D
(29) 'INPUT THE NUMBER OF FLECHETTES PER PROJECTILE'
(30] NED
[31) 'INPUT THE RANGE TO TARGET WHEN ENGAGED BY GUN (KM)'




[37) A DATA ECHO
[383 D÷'T7E FOLLOWING DATA HAS BEEN INPUT:'
[393 ]-I'TARGET RANGE = '.(*RANGE),' KM'
[403 0÷'VULNERABLE AREA : 'I(.WULAREA).' SQUARE METERS'
[41) 0. 'DISPERSION HALF ANGLE ='.(IPHID),' DEGREES'
(42) IJ'ANGULAR MISS STANDARD DEVIATION ',.(vALPHAMR).' MILLIRADIANS'
[43) 0.'NUMBER OF FLECHETTES PER PROJECTILE : ',(*N)
u44) 0.' 1
(453 A
(463 A DATA VERIFICATION
(47) 0.'IF THIS DATA IS INCORRECT. TYPE ''0"''





C52) A CALCULATION OF VULNERABLE AREA RADIUS (ASSUMED CIRCULAR)
£53) RV+(VULAREA#(o1))*0.5
C5'43 0+' VULNERABLE RADIUS ~.eV'METERS.'
£55) a








£64) A CALCULATION OF RADiAL MISS DEVIATION
£65) SIGMA*DISTxALPBA
£66) O.'RADIAL MISS DEVIATION = '.(fSIGMA),' M AT A RANGE OF '.(SRANGE),'E
£67) a




£72) A CALCUALTION 0! PROBABILITIES P1 AND P2
£73) A Pi = PROBABILITY THAT PENETRATOR DISK COVERS TARGET AREA
£74) A P2 =PROBABILITY THAT PENETRATOR DISK MIXSSES TARGET AREA
£75) A PI1+ P2 = 1, IS. MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE AND EXEAUSTIVE
£76) P2+* (0. 5xC2x (2*2))
£77) P1*1-P2
£78) a
£79) A CALCULATION OF PROBABILITY TEAT NO PENETRATORS BIT TARGET
£80) A GIVEN TEAT PENETRATOR DISK OVERLAPS TARGET
£91) A NUMBER TO EXT TARGET IS BINOMIAL WITE PROBABILITY RHO
£823 A




£87) A PROBABILITY OF AT LEAST ONE BIT EQUALS 1-P(NO BITS)
£88) A CALCUALTION OF PROBABILITY OF AT LEAST ONE BIT
£89) PNIT.1-(P2+(PlXPO))
£90) A
£91) a CALCULATION OF DERIVATIVE OF PROBABILITY 1/RI DETONATION DISTANCE
£92) PPRIME+(C2xZxP2)-(((C2xZxP2)XPO)+Nx((Po*(+N))*(N-1))x2x(RV*2)xPl+(Clx
£93) A
£94) a ASSIGNMENT OF OUTPUT TO X MATRIX
£95) XE1:)+Z




£100) A CALCULATION OF MAXIMUM PROBABILITY OF 2 1 PSNETRATOR BIT
£101) PMAX+PB~fIT£14PBIT
£102) a
£103) A CALCULATION OF DETONATION DISTANCE GIVING MAXIMUM MI~ BIT)
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[1041 A THUS, ZMAX IS OPIMAL DEONATON DISTANCE
11053 ZMAXZi+,c~PBIT3
[1063 O.'IMAXINUM PROBABILITY OF k 1 ITEl tto(*P)AX),'ATr Z '.(VZMAX),'METERS.'
[1073 a
C1083 A CALCULATION OF RENETRA.TOR DISK RADIUS A.T TARGET RANGE
[109) 12.'PROJECTILE RADIUS ='.(*(ZMAXx(C1IrO.5))),' MEERS.6
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APPENDIX B GAMS NON-LINEAR OPTIMIZATION PROGRAM
1 * ----- GAMS AND DOLLAR CONTROL OPTIONS-
2 * (SEE APPENDICES B & C)
3
4 OPTIONS
5 LIMCOL = 0 , LIMROW = 0 , SOLPRINT = OFF,
6 DECIMALS = 4 , RESLIM = 100
7 OPTCR = 0.0 , SEED = 3141 ;
8
9 * ----- DEFINITIONS AND DATA ---------------------------
10
11 SCALARS
12 * ---------------- DATA CONTROLLED BY USER ------------
13
14 RANGE RANGE TO TARGET /1.0/
15 AV TGT VULNERABLE AREA SQ METERS /5.0/
16 SIGMAA ANGULAR DELIVERY ERROR MR /5.0/
17 PHI DISPERSION CONE HALF ANGLE /15.0/













30 RV = SQRT(AV/PI);
31
32 SIGMAT = RANGE *SIGMAA;
33
34 Cl = (SIN(PHI*PI/180)/COS(PHI*PI/180))**2;
35
36 C2 = Cl / (SIGMAT**2);
37
38 * ----------------- MODEL --------------------------------------
39
40 POSITIVE VARIABLES
41 Z DETONATION DISTANCE
42 P1 PROBABILITY PENETRATORS COVER TARGET
43 P2 PROBABILITY PENETRATORS DO NOT COVER TARGET




48 PKILL PROBABILITY THAT THE TARGET IS KILLED;
49
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56 OBJ PROBABILITY OF KILL
57 PROBI CALCULATE P1
58 PROE2 CALCULATE P2
59 PROBO CALCULATE P0
60 A ENSURE PKILL IS A PROBABILITY
61
62 * MAXIMIZE




67 * SUBJECT TO
68
69 PROB1.. P1 =E= 1 - EXP(-0.5*(C2*Z**2))
70 PROB2.. P2 =E= EXP(-0.5*(C2*Z**2)) ;
71 PROBO.. P0 =E= 1 - (RV**2/(C1*Z**2));
72
73 A.. PKILL =L= 1.0
74
75
76 MODEL ROCKET /ALL/;
77 SOLVE ROCKET USING NLP MAXIMIZING PKILL;
78 * -------------------- REPORTS --------------------------------
79 * ECHO DATA AND PRINT PARAMETERS
80 DISPLAY RANGE,AV,SIGMAA,PHI,N,RV,SIGMAT,C1,C2;
81
82 * PRINT THE OPTIMAL OBJECTIVE VALUE AND SOLUTION.
83 DISPLAY Z.L, PKILL.L;
PARAMETERS
AV TGT VULNERABLE AREA SQUARE METERS
Cl
C2
N NUMBER OF PENETRATORS
PHI DISPERSION CONE HALF ANGLE
PI CONSTANT PI
RANGE RANGE TO TARGET
RV
SIGMAA ANGULAR DELIVERY ERROR MILLIRADIANS
SIGMAT
VARIABLES
P0 PROBABILITY NO HITS IF PENETRATORS COVER TARGET
P1 PROBABILITY PENETRATORS COVER TARGET
P2 PROBABILITY PENETRATORS DO NOT COVER TARGET




A ENSURE PKILL IS A PROBABILITY






COMPILATION TIME = 0.074 MINUTES
MODEL STATISTICS SOLVE ROCKET USING NLP FROM LINE 77
MODEL STATISTICS
BLOCKS OF EQUATIONS 5 SINGLE EQUATIONS 5
BLOCKS OF VARIABLES 5 SINGLE VARIABLES 5
NON ZERO ELEMENTS 11 NON LINEAR N-Z 5
DERIVATIVE POOL 5 CONSTANT POOL 6
CODE LENGTH 129
GENERATION TIME 0.065 MINUTES
EXECUTION TIME 0.158 MINUTES
SOLUTION REPORT SOLVE ROCKET USING NLP FROM LINE 77
SOLVE SUMMARY
MODEL ROCKET OBJECTIVE PKILL
TYPE NLP DIRECTION MAXIMIZE
SOLVER MINOS5 FROM LINE 77
•*** SOLVER STATUS 1 NORMAL COMPLETION
•*** MODEL STATUS 2 LOCALLY OPTIMAL
OBJECTIVE VALUE 0.6945
RESOURCE USAGE, LIMIT 0.299 100.000
ITERATION COUNT, LIMIT 28 1000
EVALUATION ERRORS 0 0
M I N 0 S 5.2 (Mar 1988)
B. A. Murtagh, University of New South Wales
and
P. E. Gill, W. Murray, M. A. Saunders and M. H. Wright
Systems Optimization Laboratory, Stanford University.
WORK SPACZ NEEDED (ESTIMATE) -- 540 WORDS.
WORK SPA2E AVAILABLE -- 18622 WORDS.
EXIT -- OPTIMAL SOLUTION FOUND
MAJOR ITNS, LIMIT 21 50
FUNOBJ, FUNCON CALLS 0 85
SUPERBASICS 1
INTERPRETER USAGE .0s
NORM RG / NORM PI 7.965E-10
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80 PARAMETER RANGE 1.0000 RANGE TO TARGET
PARAMETER AV - 5.0000 TGT VULNERABLE AREA
SQUARE METERS
PARAMETER SIGMAA = 5.0000 ANGULAR DELIVERY
ERROR MILLIRADIANS
PARAMETER PHI 15.0000 DISPERSION CONE HALF
ANGLE






83 VARIABLE Z.L = 35.2592 DETONATION DISTANCE
VARIABLE PKILL.L = 0.6945 PROBABILITY THAT THE
TARGET IS KILLED
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APPENDIX C DIFFUSE GAUSSIAN MODEL APL COMPUTER PROGRAM
t0] X+GAUSSIAN
[E] a PROGRAMMER fT JOSEPH J. EE9L. USN
(2] A US NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
[3] A JANUARY 1992
(ol A
E5] A THIS PROGRAM COMPOTES TIE PROBABILITY THAT AT LEAST ONE
E63 A FLECHETTB PENETRATOR PROM A RIPERVELOCZTY ROCKET SITS THE
E7] A TARGET VULNERABLE AREA AS BASED ON DIFFUSED GAUSSIAN MDEOLS
(8] a OF THE TARGET AND PENETRATOR SPRAY. CHAPTER V Oi i.rIS THESIS.
(9] A
[103 a DATA INPUT
[11] a USER MUST IrNPOT:[123 A TARGET VULNERABRLE A•EA (SQUARE MTERS)
(133 a DISPERSION CONE HALZ ANCE (DEGREES)
(143 A NUMBER OF FLECRETrES PER ROCKET
[153 A TARGET RANGE REIN ENGAGED (KILOMETERS)
(16] A ANGULAR DELIVERY ERROR DEVIATION (MIrLIRADIANS)
C173 A
[is] INPUT:'********** DATA INPUT *********'
E193 0÷'INPUT TEE NUMBER OF PLECHEETES PER ROCKET.'
C203 N+0
(21] PHZ'-lOOpO
(223 O+'INPUT TEE RANGE AT MRICH TARGET IS ENGAGED (KM). 6
[233 R+rl
[243 A
C253 a CONVERSION OF ENGAGEMENT RANGE TO METERS
[26] RANGE+Rxl000
E273 DA'INPUT THE OAV VULNERABLE AREA (SQUARE METERS).'
[283 AV+0
C29] a
[30] A CALCULATION OF VULNERABLE RADIUS BASED ON CIRCULAR AREA
[31] RV÷(AV4(ol))*0.5
[323 9
C33] 3 COMPUTATION OF PARAMETER B
E34] B÷RV*(2*O.5)
[353 0.'INPUT THE PENETRATOR SPRAY CONE RALF ANGLE (DEGREES).'
[36] PaID+o
(373 a
(38] A CONVERSION OF POI TO RADIANS
[393 PHI.(PDIDx(ol))4180
[40] D+'INPUT TEE STANDARD DEVIATION OF ANGULAR ERROR (HrLLIRADIANS).'
E41) ALFAMR4O
[421] A
[43] A DATA ECHO
(44] 13+' 1
[45] D1'TRE FOZOVING DATA BAS BEEN INPUT:'
C463 0.'TARGHT RANGE Z'.R).' gut
[47] O'VOLNERABLE AREA ',(YAV),' SQUARE METERS'
48] 3 0+'DISPERSION Bazy ANGLE ',(*PBID)3, DEGREES'
[49] tl*'ANGULAR MISS STANDARD DEVZATION z '.(eALFAMR).' MILLIRADIANS'




[53) a DATA VERZFICATION
[5'43 O.' I' TMIS DATA IS INCORRECT TYPE ''00"'




[593 A CONVERSION OF ANGULAR DEVIATION TO RADIANS
[603 SIGMAA+ALFAIR1000
£613 A
£623 A CALCULATION OF RADIAL MISS DISTANCE DEVIATION
£633 SIGMAT+RANGExSIGMAA
E6143 A





£70) A LOOP TO VARY DETONATION DISTANCE Z FROM 9 TO 100 METERS
[71) LI:Z+Z+l
£72) A
[73) A CALCULATION OF PENETRATOR SPRAY DEVIATION
£74)• BASED ON DETONATION DISTANCE Z AND ANGLE FBI
[75) SIGMAP÷Zx(3oPHE)*2
[76) A
[77) P ASSIGNMENT OF BINOMIAL PARAMETER J
£78) J+0.IN
£79) a
[80) a COMPUTATION OF SUN B*2 + SIGMAP*2
[81) C14(B*2)+(SIGMAP*2)
[823 a
[833 A COMPUTATION OF BINOMIAL SERIES SUMMANDS
[843 SUGMAND+(J!N)x(((-1x(B*2))4Ci)*j)xCI,((Jx(SIGMAT*2))+C1)
£953 A
[863 A COMPUTATION OF PROBABILITY OF NO PENETRATOR BITS
£973 PMGEVENZ.+/SUMMAND
£88) A
[899 n COMPUTATION OF PROBABILITY OF AT LEAST ONE BIT
[90) PRGIVENZ.1I-PMGIVENZ
£91) A STORAGE OF PROBABILITY OF DAMAGE CONDITIONED ON Z
[923 PRZ£Z)÷PBGIVENZ
£93) a
94)3 A COMPUTATION OF MAXIMUM PROBABILITY OF AT LEAST ONE BIT
[953 PMAX+(PMAXx(PMAX>PBGIVENZ))+(PRGIVENZx(PMAXHPBGIVENZ))
£96) A
[973 a COMPUTATION OF DETONATION DISTANCE ZMAX WHICH GIVES MAXIMUM
£98) a PROBABILITY OF AT LEAST ONE BIT
[99) ZMAX+(ZMAXx (PMAX>PBGIVENZ) )4+(Zx(PMAbXSPBGIVENZ))
[100) A
[102) a
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